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Nelson: Categorizing Zipporah's Petition

CATEGORIZING ZIPPORAH'S PETITION
William E. Nelson*
Let me begin by expressing how much I enjoyed reading and
hearing Melinde Sanborn's fascinating essay on Zipporah's case. I
cannot emphasize enough how valuable work like Sanborn's is to
historians such as myself who try to write synthetic histories of colonial
American law or colonial society more generally. We need to have
access to as much archival material as possible in situations where
considerations of time and resources make travel to every extant archive
unfeasible.
Three months ago I received an e-mail requesting that I "write . .. a

few short pages on the context and significance of the case," as well as
"verify the legal statements of the author, who is not a lawyer, and to
suggest any relevant historical sources ... (specifically including your
own) that should be cited." So here goes.
I begin with what I take to be the fundamental lesson of legal
realism and of the first year of law school: that one cannot confidently
extract law from a single statute or from a reading of a single case.
Ambiguities always lurk in the interstices of statutes. To resolve those
ambiguities and thereby determine the complete meaning of a statute, a
lawyer needs to examine how the statute has been applied in a range of
subsequent cases. Similarly, although a reading of a single case will
show how the court decided that case and will offer a prediction about
how judges will resolve analogous cases in the future, it will not reveal
what constitutes an analogous case. The likeness of cases can be
apprehended only by examining a range of cases, including both those
which courts find analogous to a first case and those which they find
distinguishable.
I can express the same lesson in a different fashion. The law will
almost never encompass and simply mirror a clear principle of either
right or wrong. Rather the law will demarcate a line between right and
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wrong-between the permissible and the impermissible-a line riddled
with twists and turns and exceptions. There is a reason why this is sonamely, that it is typically impossible to articulate a principle of right or
wrong except in the context of background norms, and once one
articulates a principle in such a manner, line-drawing is inevitable.
Melinde Sanborn may not be a lawyer, but she understands the
nature of law extraordinarily well. Thus, she has been extremely careful
not to draw large conclusions on the basis of the one case she has
presented to us. But she does raise important questions, and her essay
offers at least implicit suggestions about what some answers might be.
What I hope to do is focus on her questions and suggestions and thereby
examine how Zipporah's case fits into the larger pattern of
Massachusetts Bay legal development as I have portrayed it in my own
work.
The largest question Sanborn raises concerns the treatment of
African Americans in seventeenth-century Massachusetts. She offers
some evidence that the status of blacks in Massachusetts had begun to
decline as early as 1656, just as it did around that time in Virginia, and
suggests that Zipporah's case further evidences that decline.' I am not
convinced. The fact that Zipporah was arrested on a charge of
fornication is not surprising; arrest was the usual form of process in
criminal cases. There is no direct evidence why she remained in jail, but
conceivably it was because she failed to make bail; she probably lacked
sufficient resources of her own, and no one else likely came to her aid.
The Parker family, by which she was employed,2 would have been the
most likely source of bail, but the Parkers had every reason to keep her
imprisoned. If they had tried to obtain bail for her, their effort might
only have resulted in a new arrest for infanticide, a nonbailable, capital
offense. If, as Sanborn suggests, the Parkers were trying to protect their
nephew Jonathan, they had every reason not to want Zipporah accused
of killing his bastard child.
But Zipporah's interests were not those of the Parkers. She wanted
to get out of jail, and she accordingly petitioned the county court before
1. Melinde Lutz Sanborn, The Case of the Headless Baby: Did Interracial Sex in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony Lead to Infanticide and the Earliest Habeas Corpus Petition in
America?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 255, 262 (2009).
2. 1 am relying here on Sanborn's conclusion, which I believe to be correct, that Zipporah
was a servant in the Parker household. Several of the documents in Sanborn's appendix indicate she
was the servant of Mrs. Manning, but document 4, part I indicates that Mrs. Manning was the
daughter of the Parkers. I assume she and her husband were living with the Parkers. See id app. at
273-74, document 4, pt. I.
3. Id. at 264-65.
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which she was charged to proceed with her case, so that she could
receive her punishment for fornication, either a fine or a whipping, and
be freed.4 Her petition forced authorities to confront the issue of
infanticide, and they did.5 An indictment for infanticide was prepared,
but the grand jury refused to find a true bill, and Zipporah was released
from jail.6 Thereafter she lived in Boston for four decades as a
sufficiently respected member of the community to own, buy, and sell
real property.7
The above reading of the facts suggests nothing to me in the way of
discrimination. Zipporah was not imprisoned for an extraordinary length
of time-probably less than three months, and the court treated her the
same as it would have treated a white defendant charged with fornication
and suspected of infanticide. The grand jury, fairly evaluating the
evidence against her, refused to indict her for the serious crime.
Subsequently, the community abided by the grand jury's decision and
accepted Zipporah as one of its members.
Just consider, in comparison, how Americans today might treat an
accused, but acquitted child molester. Or how eighteenth-century South
Carolina punished murder-the death penalty if the victim was white but
a £700 fine if the victim was black and only half that amount "if the
9
killing occurred in 'a sudden heat or passion, or by undue correction."'
A second large question that Melinde Sanborn raises concerns the
degree of formalism in 1660s' Massachusetts law. I read her, perhaps
incorrectly, as assuming that the Bay Colony had rules that were more
fixedo than I believe it had. In volume one of The Common Law in
Colonial America," I concluded that the leaders of mid-seventeenthcentury Massachusetts recognized the inevitability of discretion in any
4. Id. at 263-64; see also THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 23 (Max Farrand

ed., Harvard Univ. Press, photo. reprint 1929) (1648) ("[I]f any man shall commit [flomication with
any single woman, they shall be punished either by enjo[ilning to [m]arriage, or [fline, or corporal[]
punishment, or all or any of these as the [jiudges in the courts of Assistants shall appoint most
agreeable to the word of God.").
5. Sanborn, supranote 1, at 267.
6. Id at 268.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 263-64.
9. William E. Nelson, The Height of Sophistication: Law and Professionalismin the CityState of Charleston, South Carolina, 1670-1775, 61 S.C. L. REv. 1, 47 (2009) (quoting Act for the
Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves in this Province, No. 670 § 37 (1740),
reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 411 (David J. McCord ed.,
Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1840)).
10. See Sanborn,supra note 1, at 259-61.
11. 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW INCOLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660 (2008).
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legal system; they sought to limit judges' exercise of discretion not by
establishing formal rules of law but by conferring that inevitable
discretion, whenever possible, either on juries or on the General Court. 12
It was only in the decades after 1660 that the Bay Colony, in response to
pressures from the restored Crown in England, began to modify its legal
system in ways, including the adoption of formalisms, which would
enable its officials to claim that in resisting the Crown they were merely
adhering to the common law.13 I find it impossible to know how far
Massachusetts had proceeded on the path toward formalism by 1663,
and hence I am inclined to draw no conclusions about how fornication
was "usually punished" in that year or about the consequences of
"[fjailure to complete . . . required steps."l 4
Sanborn's essay raises two further, smaller issues. Was Zipporah's
application to the county court the earliest habeas corpus petition in
America? Or was it merely a motion before a court that already
possessed jurisdiction over a case to proceed in a timely fashion to
judgment? I am inclined to think it was the latter, but I am uncertain. I
have found thousands of habeas corpus writs in colonial court records
and, as far as I can recall, all of them involved an effort by a litigant to
transfer jurisdiction over a case from a court in which the case was
pending to a different court with supervisory jurisdiction. I have also
seen thousands of motions to expedite judicial proceedings. Zipporah's
application looks more like the latter than the former, but it also looks
far more like a twenty-first-century habeas corpus case than nearly all
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writs do. Hence my uncertainty.
Finally, was Zipporah guilty of infanticide? And, who was the
father of her child? I have the good fortune every year, or perhaps it is
the misfortune, of discussing in my legal ethics course the prosecution
against O.J. Simpson for murdering his wife. The issue I seek to analyze
concerns the behavior of Johnny Cochran, Simpson's attorney. I find
that nearly every student determines whether Cochran's behavior was
ethical or unethical on the basis of his or her decision whether Simpson
was guilty or not guilty. I always argue, unsuccessfully, that the jury
found Simpson not guilty, and that we must accept that finding, and
adjudicate Cochran's behavior on the basis thereof. For similar reasons I
conclude that Zipporah was not guilty.

12.
13.
1686,47
14.

Id. at 73, 77.
See William E. Nelson, The Utopian Legal Orderof the MassachusettsBay Colony, 1630AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 183, 195, 201 (2005).
Sanborn, supra note 1, at 259.
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But I wonder what you, the audience, think. Do you have difficulty
accepting the judgment of the contemporary fact-finder? Why? Might it
be that in all three cases, you cannot keep race-that of Simpson,
Cochran, and Zipporah-out of your mind? That certainly is true of my
students: students of color nearly all find Simpson innocent and
Cochran's behavior ethical, while most white students reach the opposite
conclusion. Might they, and along with them, we, be more racist than the
people of seventeenth-century Boston, who appear to have readily
accepted the jury's verdict?
Melinde Sanborn's essay can render an enormous service in making
all of us-privately and in our own souls-confront this greatest of
questions.
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